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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS:
AN INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
Samuel J. Levine*
Determining the place and use of capital punishment in the American legal
system is a challenging affair and one that is closely associated with and
determined by religion's role in American legal decision-making. Both capital
punishment and religion are controversial issues, and tend to challenge legal
scholars and practitioners about whether they shouldfunction together or alone as
validparts of the legal system in the United States. Professor Levine argues that
religious arguments should be employed to interpret and explain American legal
thought when the need or proper situation arises. He uses capital punishment as
an example of how to properly reconcile a controversial legal issue with religious
thought. Professor Levine suggests that religion acts as a comparative law model
and provides another valid and instructive way of viewing capital punishment.
Religious thought serves to provide explanation and insight into controversial
American legal issues, and helps legal scholars and practitioners towardforming
permanent solutions.
INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the relationship between religion and capital punishment is
particularly challenging, involving a synthesis of at least two highly complex and
controversial issues: the place of capital punishment in the United States and the
place of religion in American legal and political decision-making. Yet, it is
arguable that these issues should be viewed together, as capital punishment raises
moral and ethical considerations' so profound that perhaps they are not properly
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See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,296 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("At
bottom, the battle [over capital punishment] has been waged on moral grounds.").
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addressed without some reference to religious thought.2 Indeed, questions of the
potential application of religion to the American legal system generally, and to
capital punishment in particular, have sparked a vast body of both scholarship and
case law presenting widely differing perspectives and approaches.3
2 Religion has consistently played a role in discussions of capital punishment in the
courtroom, judicial opinions, and legal scholarship. See, e.g., Craig J. Albert, Challenging
Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived From Panel Data, 60 U. PITT.
L. REV. 321, 347-50 (1999); Chad Baruch & Karsten Lokken, Research of Jewish Law
Issues: A Basic Guide andBibliographyfor Students and Practitioners, 77 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 303, 304 n.15 (2000) (stating that "[p]rosecutorial reference to Jewish law as it
relates to capital punishment has frequently been the subject of appellate discussion" and
citing sources); Kevin M. Doyle, A Catholic Lawyer's View of the Death Penalty, 29 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 949 (1998); Robert F. Drinan, S.J., Will Religious Teachings andInternational"
Law End Capital Punishment?, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 957 (1998); John H. Garvey & Amy V.
Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 306 (1998); Damien P.
Horigan, Of Compassion and Capital Punishment: A Buddhist Perspective on the Death
Penalty, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 271 (1996); Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law
and Its Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1037, 103 8-39 n.4-6 (1998) [hereinafter Levine, Capital Punishment] (citing sources);
Samuel J. Levine, Playing God: An Essay on American Capital Punishment, 31 NEW MEX.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) [hereinafter Levine, Playing God]; Sister Helen Prejean, C.S.J.,
Capital Punishment: The Humanistic andMoral Issues, 27 ST. MARY's L.J. 1 (1995); Irene
Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Lone Star Liberal Musings on "Eye for Eye" and
the Death Penalty, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 505, 509 n.12 (1998) (citing sources); Robert W.
Tuttle, Death's Casuistry, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 371 (1998); Elizabeth A. Brooks, Note, Thou
Shalt Not Quote the Bible: Determining the Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious
Philosophy and Themes in Oral Arguments, 33 GA. L. REV. 1113 (1999); Brian C. Duffy,
Note, Barring Foul Blows: An Argument for a Per Se Reversible-Error Rule for
Prosecutors' Use of Religious Arguments in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1335 (1997).
In addition, it is arguable that reference to religious sources for guidance in questions
related to capital punishment is consistent with the Supreme Court's repeated emphasis on
the defendant's moral culpability as a factor in a determination of a capital sentence. See
William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demonstration
of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 625 & nn.95-101
(1999) (citing cases); Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:
Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 21, 36 n.65 (1997) (same); Laura S. Underkuffler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions
in Law: Death and Other Cases, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1724-25 (1999) (same);
see also Levine, Playing God, at Part I (citing and analyzing cases and articles).
3 See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, Law, Ethics, and Religion in the Public Square:
Principles of Restraint and Withdrawal, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 773, 773 n.2 (2000) (citing
sources); see also Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 203, 205-06 (1998). This article describes the debate between Michael
McConnell and Bruce Ackerman on whether lawmakers and judges may permissibly rely
on religious beliefs, and observes that
[w]ith passion and eloquence, McConnell favored-and Ackerman opposed-
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Using capital punishment as an example, this Essay aims to suggest an
intermediate approach to the application of religious thought to American legal
issues.4 This Essay posits that American law should not grant religious principles
an intrinsic measure of legal authority in answering American legal questions.' At
the same time, religious thought should not be rejected as a source of reasoning in
American legal analysis. Thus, this Essay supports an approach that allows
religious arguments to be considered and possibly adopted on the basis of their
potential relevance and logic vis-a-vis American legal thought. While such an
approach places certain limitations on the influence of religious principles in
American law, at the same time this mode of analysis does not automatically
exclude religious arguments that have relevance independent of their religious
significance.6 Therefore, this approach likely allows for widespread use of religious
ideas in American legal discourse, as religious ideas are acceptable to the extent that
they present ideas that are helpful in considering questions arising in American
legal thought.
permitting reliance on religious beliefs .... [Elach scholar saw himself as
speaking for the long-settled consensus of American political culture-one that
until recently would have needed little explicitjustification-and each portrayed
his opponent ... as someone seeking to disrupt this consensus.
Id; cf MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
RELIGION FREDERICK CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 27 (1995) (contrasting scholars who "have
contended that American politics and public life are hostile to religion" with those "baffled
by the suggestion that American public life discriminates against religion"); Suzanna Sherry,
Enlightening the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 473,477 (1996) (describing
"[t]he gulf between those who would rely on faith and those who would rely on reason" and
citing illustrations of respective positions).
4 It should be recognized, however, that the very notion of an intermediate position
toward a legal controversy, in particular one relating to religion, may depend in large degree
on difficult questions of neutrality and perspective. See GEDICKS, supra note 3; Samuel J.
Levine, The Challenges of Religious Neutrality, 13 J. L. & RELIGION 531 (1998-99); Samuel
J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a
Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153 (1996).
' Cf United States v. Lynch, No. 96-6137, 1996 WL 717912, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 11,
1996) (rejecting argument, based on natural law, that it should nullify statute for "violat[ing]
principles superior to the Constitution" and finding that "[u]nder Supreme Court precedent,
well-settled constitutional principles, and the rule of stare decisis, we decline to invalidate
a federal statute ... on the basis of natural law principles").
6 Consistent with the attempt to support an intermediate position, this approach thus
rejects what one scholar has called a "dogma[ I of liberalism," the categorical view that
"religious beliefs are irrational or non-rational and therefore cannot meet the standards of
public reason." Ronald F. Thiemann, Religion andLegal Discourse: An Indirect Relation,
81 MARQ. L. REv. 289, 296 (1998).
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I. THE GENERAL APPROACH: RELIGION AS COMPARATIVE LAW
In an illuminating contribution to a symposium that explored the relationship
between religion and the judicial process,7 Professor Steven Smith offers a strong
argument for the inclusion of religious perspectives in the consideration of
American legal questions.' In response to the position that "any governmental
reliance on religion is improper,"9 Smith cites Professor Stephen Carter's argument
that, in the context of constitutional interpretation, "ifjudges may properly consult
views of morality or philosophy outside the text, then there is no good reason to
restrict them from considering religious perspectives."'0 Expanding on Carter's
thesis, Smith suggests that "[a] similar argument could be made, perhaps even more
cogently, about judicial common law-making."" Therefore, rejecting the
"distorting image of religion as a 'self-contained package' ... relevant mostly to
specialized or exotic issues,"' 2 Smith finds that "it hardly seems surprising that
religion might be relevant to the broad range of issues considered in the law."'
Smith convincingly observes that
[a]fter all, religious teachers, prophets, theologians, and mystics have
over the centuries spoken profoundly on the crucial issues of birth, life,
family, work, commitment, government, justice, violence, deceit, and
death. These are the same kinds of issues that come before the courts on
a daily basis for discussion and resolution. 4
See Symposium, Religion and the Judicial Process: Legal, Ethical, and Empirical
Dimensions, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 177 (1998).
' See Smith, supra note 3.
9 Id. at 217.
1o Id. at 217 (citing Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 932 (1989)). As Smith puts it, "if the Constitution does not enact Herbert Spencer,
neither does it enact John Stuart Mill; but we do seem to carry on a sort of active flirtation
with Mill's ideas." Id. at 209; see also Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values
in Judicial Decision-Making, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 513, 518 (1998). He states:
We are free to hear the voices of religious values, mathematical principles,
classical literature, popular music, and quotations by Sherlock Holmes in our
effort to understand the issues we must consider .... Judges are free to hear the
voices of William Shakespeare, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, John Locke, Robert
Browning, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Moses,
Jesus, Sojourner Truth, Frederick Douglass, and Martin Luther King, Jr.,
without embarrassment or hesitation as we deliberate.
Id
Smith, supra note 3, at 217.
SId at215.
3 Id at216.
14 Id.
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Indeed, he declares, "[i]t would be remarkable if religion did not have much to say
about many of these issues."'" Premised on these observations, Smith relies on
religious principles to offer an innovative alternative to current legal doctrine
regarding the law of damages, incorporating religious insights into the complexity
of human reaction to the effects of personal injury. 6
Significantly, however, in response to criticism that his approach requires
acceptance of religious beliefs, Smith explains that these insights "might be
religious in character, but there seem[s] to be no reason why they need to be
religious" in nature." Thus, Smith's approach appears to achieve a balance: a
willingness to consider relevant teachings that may be gleaned from religious
perspectives without accepting the authority of religious values in American legal
thought. s To the extent that such an approach would not only permit but require
an examination of the rationale behind a religious principle and the soundness of
its reasoning within the logic of American legal thought, the approach may prove
acceptable to some who have expressed opposition to judicial incorporation of
religious ideas. 9
'5 Id.
16 Seeid. at218-27.
17 Id at 225 (emphasis in original).
"s Cf Daniel 0. Conkle, Religiously Devout Judges: Issues of Personal Integrity and
Public Benefit, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 523, 531 (1998). The author suggests that
the most promising type of religiously informed judging would view religion as
an independent source of moral truth, but a source to be tested and put in
conversation with competing sources .... [t]his form ofjudicial thinking would
permit a judge's religion to play an important role in the process of judicial
decisionmaking. At the same time, however, by placing his or her religious
source of truth in conversation with competing sources-secular as well as
religious-it would avoid the narrowness of religious fundamentalism, a
narrowness that too often leads to moral understandings that are seriously
incomplete, if not simply mistaken .... no claims of truth, whether secular or
religious, should be immune from challenge, criticism, or debate.
Id.; Griffen, supra note 10, at 518-19 (explaining that "[rleligious values are neither more,
nor less, appropriate factors for justifying judicial decisions from a philosophical
perspective" and that "[t]he mere fact that religious voices are different from others does not
make them less reliable, less articulable, or less deserving of consideration and assertion, nor
are they less susceptible to candid criticism and debate in the judicial context"); id. at 521
(stating that "the sources from which we obtain our conception of justice should not be
artificially restricted. We must certainly deliberate and debate their validity with vigorous
diligence out of proper regard for sound reasoning"); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Checking the
Artifacts of Canaan: A Comment on Levinson's "Confrontation," 39 DEPAULL. REV. 1133,
1142 (1990) ("Substantive pluralism, serious about moral values, would be a society in
which moral beliefs are described, aired, and discussed, even in legislatures and in the
courts. No moral belief would be silenced because it was also religious.").
'9 See, e.g., Robert Audi, Religious Values, Political Action, and Civic Discourse, 75
IND. L.J. 273, 276-77 (2000) (adopting a "principle of secular rationale .... that citizens
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In fact, through this approach, the value of religious ideas to American law may
be analogous to the effective use of comparative law to help illuminate and develop
legal principles.2" As Smith observes, and as his example of the law of damages
illustrates, religious systems often raise and address issuesthat arise in American
law, examining these issues from a different point of view. Religion, then, may
provide a contrast case to the American legal system, offering perspectives that may
shed light or perhaps offer useful alternatives in assessing both settled and emerging
areas of law.2'
in a liberal democracy have a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or
public policy that restricts human conduct, unless they have, and are willing to offer, an
adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support," and "taking a secular reason as
roughly one whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justificatory element,
does not evidentially depend on the existence of God (or on denying it) or on theological
considerations, or on the pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority");
Sherry, supra note 3, at 492,478 (arguing that "government may not make decisions that are
themselves based on contested religious beliefs that cannot be rationally supported, that
privilege religious over secular beliefs, or that single out religious beliefs from among other
nonrational beliefs for preferential treatment," but that "to the extent that a religiously-
motivated conclusion is also supportable by rational argument, it should not pose a problem
in a secular state; it is only nonrational arguments that threaten the primacy of reason");
Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safer for Religious
Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 501 (1998) (positing that "religious reasons should not
be deemed legitimate justifications for public policy" because '"[a]ll laws should be justified
by secular reasons accessible to all citizens, whether religious or not").
20 See generally Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of
Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025 (1999) (describing different forms of comparative law).
21 Cf P. John Kozyris, Comparative Law for the Twenty-First Century: New Horizons
andNew Technologies, 69 TUL. L. REv. 165, 167 (1994) ("[T]he utility of the comparative
method is beyond dispute. Comparative law not only provides alternative solutions to be
used in legal reform but also gives us a better understanding of our existing law. In short,
it is an indispensable tool of legal science."); Shmuel Shilo, The Contrast Between Mishpat
lvri and Halakhah, 20 TRADITION 91, 98 (1982). The author states
The most important and fruitful aspect of the comparative method ... is the in-
depth study of legal institutions, both in the Jewish legal system and in the other
legal systems, in order to understand how universal questions of law (and let us
remember that most legal problems seeking a solution, are universal in nature)
are answered by Jewish law as compared with other legal systems. Often the
solutions to similar problems resemble each other in all legal systems, but many
times Jewish law has its own unique approach to a question or a legal
institution.
Id.
Indeed, courts and scholars have employed principles from the Jewish legal system, for
example, to analyze numerous areas of American law. For a compilation of sources, see, for
example, Daniel 6i. Ashbum, Appealing to a Higher Authority?: Jewish Law in American
Judicial Opinions, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 295 (1994) (providing an historical overview
of Jewish law in American Jurisprudence); Baruch & Lokken, supra note 2; Samuel J.
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Moreover, in addition to providing a helpful theoretical framework and offering
a thought-provoking application of the theory, Smith's approach appears to paint
an accurate descriptive portrait of the attitudes of many judges who incorporate
religious thinking into their judicial opinions. While scholars have documented
numerous examples ofjudicial citation of religious principles,22 as Professor Kent
Greenawalt has noted, ajudge "is not likely to say that an otherwise debatable legal
conclusion is correct because it conforms to Christianity, or some other supposedly
true religious understanding."23
II. APPLYING THE APPROACH: THE EXAMPLE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Scholars and courts alike have addressed the relationship between various
religious traditions and the administration of capital punishment in the United
States.24 An examination of some of the attempts to apply religious principles in
this area suggests that religious thought has much to offer the contemporary debate
over capital punishment. At the same time, it appears that the value of many
religious arguments lies in their appeal to a logic that need not rely on the authority
of a religious system.
Levine, Jewish Legal Theory andAmerican Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and
Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 442-43 nn.3-11 (1997); Samuel J. Levine,
Teaching Jewish Law in American Law Schools: An Emerging Development in Law and
Religion, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041 (1999); Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the
Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal
Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 817-19 nn.14-28 (1993).
22 See, e.g., Ashburn, supra note 21 (describing American use of Jewish law); Scott C.
Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433
(1993); see also Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder ofSuccess-My Spiritual Journey,
27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1139 (1996) (describing a Texas judge's spiritual journey through
life). But see Conkle, supra note 18, at 530 n. 17 (stating that "[flor whatever reasons, it is
rare for judges in the contemporary United States to openly refer to religious
values-whether their own or those of the culture-as support for theirjudicial decisions");
Griffen, supra note 10, at 517. The author states:
We claim to respect the role of moral knowledge in helping us think and debate
our varying ideas about what the legal principles should be, and we profess a
desire to have men and women serve as judges who possess moral knowledge.
But we want the moral knowledge to originate from secular sources, not those
that are religious.
Id.; Smith, supra note 3, at 213 (finding that "the neglect of religious perspectives, or of
religion as a possible resource, persists in the discourse of legal practice; there is little
evidence of religious ideas in the typical lawyer's brief or judicial opinion").
23 KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 142 (1995). For
a discussion supporting this practice on a normative level, see Levine, supra note 3, at 776-
77 & nn.10-21.
24 See supra note 3.
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For example, in a recent symposium about capital punishment,25 Kevin Doyle,
the Capital Defender of New York State, spoke "as a Catholic about [his] views of
the death penalty."26 Doyle identified three fundamental propositions, based in his
Catholic faith, underlying his opposition to capital punishment: "(1) that human
beings are fallible; (2) that racism is mortally sinful; and (3) that human life is
sacred."27 The articulation of these three rationales is significant in that each idea,
though supported by theological beliefs, finds a basis in American legal reasoning,
independent of religious thinking.28 The acknowledgment that human beings are
fallible is indisputable and serves as one of the main arguments for opponents to
capital punishment, who warn that human error may result in the implementation
of the most severe and irrevocable of punishments. 9 Likewise, death penalty
opponents point to statistics demonstrating the influence of racial factors in
determining the likelihood that a particular individual will be sentenced to death.3°
25 See Symposium, Thoughts on Death Penalty Issues Twenty-Five Years After Furman
v. Georgia, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1998).
26 Doyle, supra note 2, at 949.
27 Id. at 950.
28 Cf William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder
to Comments on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1001 (1999). The author
states:
Most of the Christian objections to the death penalty have secular analogues in
the liberal public critique. No doubt many lawyers who participate in anti-death
penalty activism draw inspiration from their religious commitments, even
though their public arguments take a secular form. And the liberal public
critique is influenced by Christian views.
Id
29 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted) ("No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony,
mistaken honest testimony, and human error remain all too real. We have no way ofjudging
how many innocent persons have been executed but we can be certain that there were
some."); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE
AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981); MICHAEL L. RADELET, ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE:
ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L.
Radelet, Miscarriages ofiustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987);
Michael L. Radelet, et al., Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since 1970 Because of
Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907 (1996); Michael L. Radelet & Hugo
Adam Bedau, The Execution of the Innocent, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1998).
30 Many authors have discussed racial bias in the administration of the death penalty. See,
e.g., ADALBERTO AGUIRRE, JR. & DAVID V. BAKER, RACE, RACISM AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1991); SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
DISCRIMINATION AND DEATH: REPORT ON EFFORTS TO STOP DISCRIMINATION IN THE
INFLICTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1990); Stephen B. Bright, Race, Poverty,
Disadvantage, and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 272 (1994); Ruth E. Friedman,
Statistics andDeath: The Conspicuous Role ofRace Bias in the Administration of the Death
Penalty, II LA RAZA L.J. 75 (1999); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky y. Kemp: Race,
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Finally, the dignity of human beingsand the importance of protecting innocent life
are fundamental to the American legal system and find powerful expression in
substantive and procedural safeguards protecting those accused of capital crimes.3
Indeed, the same arguments that Doyle identified as religious in nature, removed
from their religious roots, have actually played a central role in contemporary
American legal discourse over capital punishment. Thus, these arguments provide
a useful example in examining the role of religious argument in the context of
capital punishment. 2
The observation that religion offers insights valuable to consideration of the
issue of capital punishment in the United States suggests that the automatic
Capital Punishment, andthe Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); Katherine
R. Kruse, Race, Angst, and Capital Punishment: The Burger Court's Existential Struggle,
9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 67 (1998); Kevin Reed, et al., Race, Criminal Justice and the
Death Penally, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 395 (1994); Melanie Shaw, Race, Statistics and the
Death Penalty, 34 How. L.J. 503 (1991); Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of
the Death Penalty: The Florida Example, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981); see also Prejean,
supra note 2, at 7 (asserting that "[w]hen you consider the history of the death penalty in this
country, it is obvious that the race of the victim has always played a part").
3 The Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that death penalty jurisprudence is
different from all other areas of the law because "death is different." See, e.g., Harris v.
Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 516 n. 1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Supreme Court cases
confirming that "death is a fundamentally different kind of penalty"); Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying "death-is-different"
jurisprudence); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) ("[D]eath is a
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.").
For scholarly treatment of the "death is different" doctrine, see, for example, HOGO
ADAM BEDAU, DEATH Is DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth
Amendment "Reasonableness," 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1674 & n. 123 (1998) ("The
Supreme Court... has rested an entire jurisprudence of capital punishment on the premise
that state killing is sui generis and that noncapital precedents sometimes provide insufficient
protection when applied in the capital context. The Court has declared by way of
justification that 'death is different."'); Underkuffler, supra note 2, at 1729 (citing Supreme
Court cases that describe uniqueness of death penalty); cf United States v. Garsson, 291 F.
646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) ("Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the
innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream."); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
358 ("[lI]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."). But see
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflection on Two Decades
of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 397 (1995)
(finding that "[t]he Court echoed the 'death is different' principle in a number of... cases,
but close examination of the Court's decisions over the past twenty years reveals that the
procedural safeguards in death cases are not as different as one might suspect").
32 At the same time, those who favor reliance on religious principles may find helpful the
realization that arguments nearly identical in substance to religious ideas have been
employed effectively when articulated without resort to religious authority.
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exclusion of religious thought might unnecessarily lessen the intellectual vitality of
public discourse. Of course, it is possible to maintain that any or all of these ideas
evolved in American society independent of religious thought. Such an objection,
however, seems largely irrelevant. To the extent that religion offers insights that,
at the very least, enrich the level of discussion, ignoring these insights would seem
to prove counterproductive and unfortunate.
Moreover, in addition to articulating arguments that often appeal to American
legal reasoning, religious thought may present these arguments in a manner and
context that lend deeper meaning to concepts already familiar within American
legal discourse. The notion that human life is sacred, for example, finds strong
support in both religious thought and in what Professor Michael Perry calls "the
moral culture of the United States."33 Therefore, according to Perry, "it would be
silly to insist that.., citizens, legislators, and other policymakers should.., forgo
reliance on the claim that every human being is sacred unless, in their judgment, a
persuasive... secular argument supports the claim."34 In short, Perry explains,
the proposition that each and every human being is sacred is not only
embedded, in one form or another, in many different religious traditions;
it is also axiomatic for most persons, including most religious
nonbelievers, who are committed to liberal democracy as the morally
best form of government and, more broadly, the idea of human rights."
Nevertheless, even if the idea that human life is sacred exists independent of
religious thought, there may be much to gain by looking at the way the idea finds
expression in religious sources. Two statements in the Talmud dramatically
emphasize the value of a single human life. First, based on the language of a verse
relating to Cain's murder of Abel,36 the Talmud observes that the commission of a
murder not only kills the actual victim of the crime; a murder also "kills" future
"3 See Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy andReligious Morality, 48 DEPAULL. REv.
1,23 (1998).
34 Id.
31 Id. at 24; cf Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel's
Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 1903 (2000) (discussing laws infringing
on basic human dignity); Roger S. Magnusson, The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die:
Social and Jurisprudential Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United
States, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 1, 39 (1997) (asserting that "the idea that all human life is
equally and intrinsically precious... has been central to the moral foundations of society
for many centuries").
36 In Genesis 4:10, God tells Cain that "the voice of your brother's blood calls out to
Me." In the original Hebrew, the word for "blood" is in the plural, prompting the Talmud's
comment that the verse refers not only to the blood of Abel himself, who was actually
murdered, but also to the blood of his descendants who, as a result of his murder, never
lived.
[Vol. 9:1
AN INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
generations who could have descended from the murder victim.37 Second, the
Talmud states, in equally dramatic terms, that preserving a single life is tantamount
to preserving an entire world.3"
Both of these statements are open to numerous interpretations and applications39
valuable to American legal thought. In fact, in the context of the American debate
over capital punishment, the importance of protecting innocent life could,
theoretically, be invoked, in various forms, by death penalty proponents and
opponents alike. Regardless of how the principle is used, however, the Talmud's
eloquent and insightful articulation of the idea that human life is sacred is likely to
add analytical and emotional depth40 to the conversation.41
3 See TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 37a.
38 See id.
For example, one interpretation by a twentieth century scholar of Jewish law and
philosophy explains the latter statement as a reference to the unique role and contribution
that each individual has in the world and the corresponding destruction that therefore results
from a murder. See 4 ELIYAHU DESSLER, MICHTAV M'ELIYAHU 89 (Aryeh Carmell ed.,
1986). An American legal scholar has cited the statement as a moving expression of the
"continuing impact" of a crime. See Benjamin B. Sendor, Restorative Retributivism, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 323, 338 (1994).
4' The emotional force of the Talmudic statements is important, as the Talmud records
that these statements were among those pronounced by judges during the cross-examination
of incriminating witnesses in capital cases, as an appeal to one who might thereby reconsider
an attempt to bear false witness. See TALMUD, supra note 37.
41 The same may be true more generally of attempts to rely on Jewish law and philosophy
in discussions of capital punishment in the United States. There has been much
documentation of the often simplistic use-and, occasionally, the apparent misuse-of
Jewish thought by judges, attorneys, and scholars who have addressed the issue of capital
punishment. See, e.g., Levine, Capital Punishment, supra note 2, at 1038-39 n.4-6 (citing
sources); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 509 n.12 (citing sources). As one
contemporary scholar of Jewish law has noted, however, there exist within Jewish legal
tradition regarding capital punishment "divergent views" that reflect "a variety of conflicting
principles." BASIL F. HERRING, JEWISH ETHICS AND HALAKHA FOR OUR TIME: SOURCES AND
COMMENTARY 170, 150 (1984). Therefore, as I have suggested elsewhere, consistent with
the approach suggested in this Essay, rather than attempting directly to rely on a supposedly
authoritative position in Jewish law, it would seem prudent to "focus[] on the conceptual
underpinnings behind pertinent Jewish law, considering the potential relevance and effect
of those conceptualizations on American legal thought." Levine, Capital Punishment, supra
note 2, at 1039.
In contrast, I have expressed doubt about attempts to apply to the American legal
system religious ideas that would seem to have meaning only within a religious system. See
id. at 1043 & nn.22-24 (asserting that "[a]lthough the processes of repentance and atonement
are inherent parts of the Jewish legal system, that is clearly not the case in American penal
law"). But see Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1351 (2000); Dennis M. Cariello, Forgiveness andthe Criminal Law: Forgiveness Through
Medicinal Punishment, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1607 (2000); Stephen P. Garvey,
Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999); David M. Lerman, Forgiveness
2000]
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Similarly, Doyle's discussion of the Catholic position that human life is sacred
offers an insight often absent from American legal discourse. Doyle emphasizes
that "it is not only the life of the executed that is sacred but also the life of the
executioners."4 In addition, according to Doyle, Catholicism teaches, based on the
Natural Law tradition, that "the greatest impact of immoral acts is not on the actee
but on the actor. So what we do as moral actors shapes us, humanizes or
dehumanizes us."'43 Though religious in origin, both of these insights are
understandable independent of religious thought. Therefore, Doyle's conclusion,
that "the exercise of the death penalty on a human being warps and numbs
people,"" is plausible without reference to Catholic doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Independent of its relationship to religion, capital punishment persists as one
of the most controversial areas of American public discourse. Thus, attempts to
address the issue of capital punishment through reliance on religious argument
appear to inject yet an additional level of complexity. After all, questions regarding
the place of religion in American legal thought have already sparked a growing
body of legal scholarship, comprising what Professor Smith has called a
"voluminous" debate.45 This Essay posits that such added complexity should be
welcomed, both as helpful in the discussion of capital punishment in the United
States and, more generally, as an example of the possibility and utility of looking
to religious thought, not as binding legal authority, but as a comparative law model
deserving attention in the consideration of American legal issues.
in the Criminal Justice System: If It Belongs, Then Why Is It So Hard to Find?, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1663 (2000); Samuel J. Levine, Teshuva: A Look at Repentance,
Forgiveness, and Atonement in Jewish Law and Philosophy andAmerican Legal Thought,
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1677 (2000).
42 Doyle, supra note 2, at 955.
43 Id.
44 Id
41 See Smith, supra note 3, at 203 n. 1.
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